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MARGINAL COST PRICING, INVESTMENT 
THEORY AND CATV: COMMENT 
VICTOR GOLDBERG 
University of California, Davis 
N his article, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, James 
Ohls' makes a number of erroneous assertions concerning the optimum pricing 
of CATV. Most of his problems stem from a failure to properly define the 
environment in which the optimum price is to be set and the role that an 
optimum price should play. If one alters Ohls' implicit (and sometimes con- 
tradictory)2 assumptions and if one keeps in mind the purpose prices should 
serve in an economic system, a number of Ohls' conclusions are altered. 
I 
Ohls states: ". .. once the programs have been created and sent over a 
system with channels and programs fixed, the marginal cost of having an ad- 
ditional subscriber tuned into them is zero. Hence, in a completely optimal 
world, actual viewing time would be priced at zero."3 This is true only if a 
completely optimal world is one in which consumer tastes are revealed without 
cost to producers. The appropriate type and amount of resources could then 
be allocated to the production of the desired mix of television shows without 
the guidance of a price system. But in such a completely optimal regime it 
would seem unnecessary to set any prices. The optimal mix of resources 
could be guided to the CATV industry, or for that matter to the cat food 
industry, by the same omniscient allocator. 
In fact, as Minasian4 demonstrated in an earlier discussion of the pricing 
of over-the-air television, charging a zero price for a television signal on the 
1 James C. Ohls, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, 13 J. Law & 
Econ. 439 (1970). 
2 For example, he seems to assume that using the price system is costless but then 
states that one of the variable costs is the cost of billing. 
3 James C. Ohls, supra note 1, at 441. 
4 Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J. Law & 
Econ. 71 (1964). See also Roland N. McKean & Jora R. Minasian, On Achieving Pareto 
Optimality: Regardless of Cost!, 5 West. Econ. J. 14 (1966) and Harold Demsetz, In- 
formation and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1969). 
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grounds that it has already been produced is not an optimal pricing policy. 
Producers charging a price (assuming exclusion of non-payers is feasible) will 
receive profit and loss signals which can convey information concerning the 
type of programs desired by consumers and concerning whether more or fewer 
resources should be allocated to television production. 
Ohls' optimal pricing system offers the consumer a choice of buying or not 
buying a one-month block of potential television viewing.5 Certainly, if 
pricing systems are nearly costless to administer, the consumer will be worse 
off if this unnecessary indivisibility is imposed upon him. If the costs of using 
the market system were such as to make it less expensive to proffer this "tied 
good" to the consumer, then efficiency might entail producing the cheaper 
(but less desirable) tied good. But this choice is by no means a foregone 
conclusion as Ohls suggests. 
In a world of incomplete information, high transaction costs and high ex- 
clusion costs the proper pricing policy for a CATV owner is to offer that mix 
of services and prices that maximizes expected profits. He can offer his poten- 
tial customers some combination of channel capacity, programming variety, 
picture quality, service quality, and provision for equitable treatment of 
customers.6 Prices could consist of a lump sum payment, a monthly payment, 
a per channel payment, or a per show payment (or some combination of 
these).' It is not possible to say, a priori, which of these would be most 
efficient. Competition in either the product market itself or in bidding for the 
privilege of running a monopoly system8 should establish which of these best 
balances the costs of transactions and exclusion with the gains in information 
and divisibility. It should be clear that the preferred mix will not be the 
same for all markets. 
Ohls is not clear as to the nature of the CATV system he analyzes. How- 
ever, the following characterization would appear to be most consistent with 
5 Ohls' optimal pricing scheme requires that the customer pay an initial fee for attach- 
ing to the system and a monthly fee to cover marginal costs. He includes in marginal 
costs a monthly cost of billing customers. Thus, pricing is not costless in his model. Yet 
he in no way justifies the implicit assumption that such billing is less costly than a 
lump sum payment or any other of the myriad pricing schemes available. 
6 This could include such problems as establishing equity between those who join the 
system initially and those who join later. It also includes provisions which would safe- 
guard customers against low initial prices and subsequent high prices when the con- 
sumer is "locked in." 
7 If the CATV operator can initiate advertising, this opens up another possible price 
variable to either be combined with those listed in the text or, perhaps, to supersede them. 
8Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. Law & Econ. 55 (1968) suggests 
that if there is competition for the privilege of being the sole producer in a certain field, 
then competitive prices could be achieved. The ability of local governments to bargain 
with cable operators might not be up to the task of protecting consumers. See Ralph 
Lee Smith, The Wired Nation, 210 Nation 588 (1970). 
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his argument. The CATV station is a passive conveyor of network originated 
shows; its market is so small that changes in preferences of viewers within 
this market would not influence the programming menu offered by the net- 
work. In this case the information content of program by program pricing is 
minimal and the basic objection to Ohls' monthly pricing would disappear- 
although there is still no reason to call the policy optimal. Such a character- 
ization would describe CATV in its early years. It is no longer adequate 
today. It is now technologically and economically feasible for cable operators 
to enter large urban markets, to form cable networks, or to originate pro- 
grams. Consequently, the information feedback of the price system is more 
valuable and program-by-program pricing is more likely to be useful-if cable 
operators are legally permitted to engage in these activities. The fact that 
these activities might be illegal should not influence the analysis. Ohls is 
trying, after all, to determine what the rules should be. 
II 
In his discussion of a rule for allocating space on a common carrier chan- 
nel,9 Ohls purports to demonstrate that allocating the space to the highest 
bidder is not necessarily the optimal rule. 
This is true because of the fact that the welfare gains accruing from the common 
carrier service accrue not only to those who use the service, but also to those who 
subscribe to the system. Selling the common carrier service to the highest bidder 
will maximize only the welfare which accrues to the buyers-the politicians using 
it for political messages. It will do this by ensuring that the person who needs the 
common carrier service the most-and is willing to pay the highest price for it- 
does in fact get it. But another potential common carrier service buyer-perhaps a 
civic association which wanted to use the CATV system to telecast a concert- 
might provide more welfare to the subscribers of the CATV system. This welfare 
gain is not captured directly by the highest bidder rule.'0 
This suggests a question. If consumer welfare resulting from the concert 
is greater, why cannot the producers of the concert make a higher bid for the 
time slot? This Ohls fails to answer, but the answer would appear to be that 
for some unspecified reason the civic association cannot be compensated for 
providing the concert. If, in fact, some malfunction of the market mechanism11 
9 A common carrier sells time (or entire channels) to program originators. As a special 
case of the common carrier problem Ohls analyzes the situation in which one of the 
bidders for the open channel is a Pay-TV operator (perhaps even the cable owner him- 
self). Ohls fails to explain how optimality is possible with a Pay-TV channel given his 
earlier statement that ". 
.. 
in a completely optimal world, actual viewing time would 
be priced at zero." James C. Ohls, supra note 1, at 441. 
To Id. at 452. 
1 It would not be difficult for the civic center to receive payment for providing the 
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prohibits one set of bidders from registering bids that reflect the value of 
the space to society it is true that the "highest bidder" system will fail to 
allocate the space appropriately. But it is unclear as to why Ohls would 
regard such incorrect pricing as an inexorable law of nature. 
Ohls' welfare function for the common carrier problem is also subject to 
question. He uses W=TR+S-C, where TR is total revenue, S is consumer's 
surplus, and C is total costs.12 The consumer's surplus depends, however, on 
the shape of the demand curve. He derives his demand curve "by asking 
potential consumers at what monthly price they would hook onto the system 
knowing that they also had to pay a given hookup price."'" But such a de- 
mand curve will not show the maximum surplus available to consumers. If the 
price system is nearly costless to administer consumers will be able to achieve 
greater levels of welfare by paying on a program-by-program basis. And if 
the pricing system is costly to administer the firm should follow the profit 
maximizing pricing policy described above. Ohls' demand curve is, therefore, 
simply a special case; if, for example, collection costs were extremely high 
the firm's optimal policy might be to charge only an initial fee and the rel- 
evant consumer's surplus would be derived from this demand curve. In short, 
there is no good reason for Ohls' demand curve to be of any interest to the 
CATV owners and no reason for policy makers to concern themselves with 
the area under it. 
broadcast either with advertising revenues, Pay-TV, or contributions. Intervention might 
be justified on grounds other than efficiency; Ohls, however, rules this out, id. at 439, 
so it will not be considered further here. 
12 Id. at 440. 
13 Id. at 446. 
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